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In this paper, we leverage the concept of organizational field, currently under-
explored in international business literature, to understand how multinational
enterprises (MNEs) from developed markets (DMs) strategically manage their
institutional context in emerging markets (EMs). To develop theoretical argu-
ments, we focus on institutional strategies and theorize how and to what extent
MNEs in central, peripheral, and intermediate field positions engage with host
country institutions in EMs. Using an international business perspective, organi-
zational theory, and illustrations from EMs, we develop a dynamic view of field
positions to identify how MNEs’ intermediate repositioning trajectories in between
the field’s center and the periphery, driven by environmental and corporate fac-
tors, lead to the associated changes in the form and scope of institutional strate-
gies deployed in EMs. In doing so, we offer testable propositions for future
research.
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INTRODUCTION
Institutions, or “multifaceted, durable social structures,
made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and
material resources” (Scott, 2001, p. 49), define the social
context in which organizations are embedded and shape
organizational actions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Due
to their global presence, multinational enterprises
(MNEs) span multiple institutional settings, and thus,
face complex societal expectations. How MNEs manage
these pressures has become a major field of inquiry
within international business (IB) scholarship informed
by institutional theory (Kostova et al., 2008). Until
recently, isomorphism, or compliance with local institu-
tions, was seen as the focal means for MNEs to secure
legitimacy and survive in host countries (Wu &
Salomon, 2016). As a result of institutional duality
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), MNE subsidiaries face the
pressures for both internal isomorphisms, or expectations
for conformity with intra-MNE norms and practices,
reinforced by the HQ, and external isomorphism, or
pressures for conformity emanating from the local insti-
tutional environment (Davis et al., 2000; Harzing, 2002).
However, in increasingly turbulent socio-political
conditions, multinational firms increasingly face rapidly
shifting legitimacy requirements (Darendeli &
Hill, 2016). As such, international business (IB) research
has started to offer insights into why and how MNEs
might engage with institutional pressures (see,
e.g., Schnyder & Sallai, 2020). What is not yet well
understood, though, is why, in dynamic institutional con-
texts, some companies may be better positioned to deal
with institutional pressures more or less proactively
(Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi, 2021).
We address this question by arguing that strategies
towards institutions are not equally available to all
MNEs but will depend on their relative social positions
in the local context, defined by neo-institutional scholars
as the organizational field. Fields are epistemic communi-
ties whose members interact “more frequently and more
fatefully with one another than with actors outside the
field” (Scott, 2001: 84). Organizations occupy different
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field positions, which by virtue of variability in status and
resource endowment they entail (Battilana et al., 2009)
offer different choices to respond to institutional pres-
sures (Kim et al., 2016), and degree of changing or
maintaining extant institutional arrangements (Battilana
et al., 2009). Although IB scholars have acknowledged
differences in subsidiary size, status, embeddedness, and
visibility along with their consequences for non-market
strategies in host countries (Hillman & Wan, 2005), few
works have problematized subsidiary field positions. As
they are associated with different organizational
responses to institutions (Kim et al., 2016), we argue that
introducing the distinction between central and peripheral
field positions, as well as intermediate repositioning trajec-
tories, can provide an in-depth understanding of how and
to what extent MNEs engage with host country institu-
tional context.
We focus our analysis on the context of emerging
markets (EMs) due to their ever-growing importance for
MNEs’ global strategy (Meschi, 2005) and idiosyncratic
institutional challenges for MNE managers (Meyer &
Peng, 2016; Luo et al., 2019). For instance, Luo
et al. (2002) highlighted the importance of MNE adapta-
tion in China, showing that it was facilitated by the “iso-
morphic mimicking” of local companies through guanxi
adoption. Yildiz & Fey (2012), on the other hand, pro-
posed that in transition economies, where institutional
demands are in flux, MNEs might adopt alternative strat-
egies to secure legitimacy from local audiences: reducing
local reliance through global procurement strategies,
leveraging positive stereotypes against ethnocentrism and
using favorability toward foreign direct investment (FDI)
to reduce pressures for external isomorphism. Although
useful, these strategies are ultimately passive as they do
not entail active engagement with institutions that create
challenges for MNEs in the first place.
To examine the broader range of ways in which
MNEs can engage with institutions in turbulent EMs to
pursue their strategic objectives, we draw on the classifi-
cation of institutional strategies formulated by Marquis
and Raynard (2015) and who identify three categories of
strategies available in EMs: relational, infrastructure-
building, and socio-cultural bridging strategies. Although
not specific to foreign companies alone, these strategies
may be particularly relevant for MNEs, as they strive for
both legitimacy and more favorable FDI conditions in
host markets (Meschi, 2005). We argue that different
field positions influence configurations of MNEs’ post-
entry institutional strategies. Our primary contribution
lies in a novel dynamic perspective on MNE organiza-
tional field positions in host markets by identifying tra-
jectories and circumstances under which MNE field
positions may change as a result of external forces and/or
internal strategizing in turbulent EM conditions. Our
paper, therefore, also contributes to the recent debates on
the field positions in neo-institutional theory by propos-
ing an alternative conceptualization of intermediate field
position (cf. Wright & Zammuto, 2013). In doing so, we
respond to the calls for more substantially incorporating
the concept of organizational fields into the study of
MNEs informed by institutional theory (Phillips &
Tracey, 2009; Donnelly & Manolova, 2020) and offer a
set of testable propositions for future research.
In what follows, we provide a brief overview of the
institutional context in EMs and summarize relevant the-
oretical arguments from neo-institutional theory. We
then offer a framework relating MNE organizational
field positions to their institutional strategies in EMs. We
close with a discussion of contributions and implications
for future research.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We develop our theoretical framework by first briefly
discussing the nature of institutional context in emerging
markets and the implications of their ongoing turbu-
lence for MNEs. We then introduce the core concepts of
our paper, namely the organizational field and the
typology of institutional strategies available to MNEs in
emerging markets, in order to set the scene for our
arguments.
Institutional context in emerging markets
The set of institutional strategies that MNEs can deploy
is likely to be shaped by the idiosyncrasies of EMs, where
periods of radical change have become a regular occur-
rence (Meschi, 2005). However, the assumptions of mal-
leability and newness of EM context to MNEs no longer
hold consistently across all EMs.
First, EMs have changed considerably over recent
decades, and historical arguments of their institutional
weakness are augmented by rapidly growing sophistica-
tion. MNEs themselves are no longer new to EMs,
shifting from reliance on global value chains that buffer
the local institutional demands (Yildiz & Fey, 2012) to
increasingly local bases (Luo, 2007). Where voids remain,
they can manifest themselves into institutional risks and
impede full utilization of MNEs’ strategic competencies
and capabilities. This relates closely to the role of state
and politics in these countries (Yaprak &
Karademir, 2011). MNEs are traditionally portrayed as
playing a pivotal role in local economic development
(Paul & Barbato, 1985), suggesting that the state appara-
tuses in EMs are geared toward accepting the contribu-
tion made by MNEs to local development. However, this
trend is reversing with the recent rise of EM multina-
tionals (EMNEs). EMNEs’ growth and improved local
competencies have intensified competition in EMs and
decreased EMs’ reliance on MNEs for knowledge trans-
fer (Luo, 2007). MNEs also face rising skepticism toward
globalization and economic nationalism around the
2 JACOB ET AL.
world, not least in EMs. For example, “Made in China
2025” and “Make in India” policies appear to reflect the
nationalistic views in these countries (Petricevic &
Teece, 2019).
The ease of MNE adaptation and pursuit of strategic
goals in EMs should, therefore, not be taken for granted.
Uneven institutional change within and across these set-
tings is likely to result in both global and local players
being subjected to different institutional pressures. This
calls for a more fine-grained examination of post-entry
strategies of MNEs in EMs (Meyer & Peng, 2016), which
we analyze by employing concepts of organizational field
positions and institutional strategies.
Field position and management of institutional
context in organization theory
The field concept is a cornerstone in institutional analy-
sis. It draws attention to the actor embeddedness within
the network of relationships as the enabling condition for
strategies towards institutions (Wooten & Hoffman,
2008). An organizational field is “a collection of diverse,
interdependent organizations that participate in a com-
mon meaning system” (Scott, 2014, p. 106).1
Organizational fields are relational spaces character-
ized by the interconnectedness of their participants,
including “key suppliers, resource and product con-
sumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations that
produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983, p. 148). The relational and networked
nature of organizational fields makes them amenable to
mapping through concepts developed in social network
analysis, including degrees of cohesiveness and centrali-
zation. However, by containing patterns of meanings, or
shared cognition, fields also act as sites of institutional
embeddedness and offer institutional infrastructure to
their participants that render their interactions relatively
predictable and coordinated (Zietsma et al., 2017). Orga-
nizational fields are regarded as the main source of pres-
sures for conformity, or isomorphism, which is a
prerequisite for social acceptance (legitimacy), and hence,
the success and survival of organizations
(Suchman, 1995). Lastly, fields differ with regard to their
types. In their recent review, Zietsma et al. (2017) distin-
guished between exchange and issue fields. Exchange
fields generally reflect relatively settled boundaries of
industries, professions, or social movements, whose mem-
bers are subjected to the processes of isomorphism and
diffusion of set norms. Issue fields emerge when partici-
pants of (typically multiple) exchange fields negotiate
meanings and practices around an issue or a cause and
are therefore less settled.
Organizational theory scholars distinguish between
field participants’ peripheral, central, or intermediate
field positions, each associated with different degrees of
interest and capacity to engage with institutions (Zietsma
et al., 2017). This interest is institutionally shaped as a
product of the extent of power and control of resources
associated with the position that actors can draw upon to
enact institutional change or maintain the status quo
(Battilana et al., 2009). These resources range from tangi-
ble (including financial and human resources) to intangi-
ble (such as social capital, legitimacy, and reputation).
Thus, peripheral actors, who are weakly embedded in the
institutional environment and loosely connected to other
actors in the field, often possess an awareness of alterna-
tive institutional arrangements, a prerequisite for chang-
ing institutions (Seo & Creed, 2002). However, they lack
social resources (status and legitimacy) and hence comply
with field rules. Central actors are strongly embedded in
the institutional environment and tightly connected to
other players in the field. A central position is privileged
as the existing institutional arrangements usually serve
the interests of predominantly central actors. Their prac-
tices, most frequently, are seen as legitimate and domi-
nant within the field (Lawrence, 1999). As a result, they
may not be motivated to challenge the existing order
(Battilana et al., 2009). However, if and when central
actors seek to do so, they can benefit from preferential
access to critical financial and political resources
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Intermediate actors are
positioned relatively between the center and periphery of
organizational fields (Wright & Zammuto, 2013). To
date, peripheral actors have been narrowly associated
with the concept of “middle-status conformity” with
dominant institutional prescriptions (Phillips &
Zuckerman, 2001). Intermediate position, however, can
offer a powerful way of understanding actor transition in
between field center and periphery, adding nuance to
actors’ manifestations of reflexivity and motivation for
proactive engagement with institutions. In this paper, we
apply these arguments to the dynamics of MNE experi-
ences in the institutional context of EMs.
There are multiple ways of applying the concept of
organizational fields for MNEs—ranging from the analy-
sis of peer groups and interorganizational networks
(Meyer & Peng, 2016) to MNEs forming their own field
of transnational actors with shared global norms and
rules (Kostova et al., 2008). Conceptualizing a field
position for the entire MNE as a global actor, although
arguably possible, offers a view of subsidiaries as
mostly disembedded from the national context. Indeed,
Phillips & Tracey (2009, p. 107) critique this standpoint
by arguing that seeing an MNEs as “being a member in a
number of geographically separate fields … does not lead
to the conclusion that [such actors] are members of
none.” Rather, it is the action of the local subsidiary that
is critical to corporate institutional strategies in local con-
texts (Hillman & Wan, 2005; Meyer & Peng, 2016;
1Although organizational fields can share with networks and clusters the element
of structural interactions, they differ from these concepts in also being constituted
by shared meaning systems or cognition (Coraiola et al., 2018).
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Regnér & Edman, 2014). Therefore, MNE subsidiaries
join local fields in host countries, as “they increase their
interactions with suppliers, customers, and competitors;
they participate in common activities such as industry
associations” and “come to be mutually aware of the
other participants in their field” (Phillips & Tracey, 2009,
p. 107). This implies that they also have to contend
with pressures for local isomorphism (Phillips &
Tracey, 2009; Shi & Hoskisson, 2012; Marano &
Kostova, 2016). The literature on embeddedness, for
instance, has long recognized that MNE units form
relationships with various actors in host countries and
that these relationships may vary in strength (Klopf &
Nell, 2018).
Based on the above discussion and following previous
research, we define a subsidiary field position as the
structural location of a subsidiary within the relevant orga-
nizational field (Wright & Zammuto, 2013; Kim
et al., 2016). For the purpose of this paper, we focus on
the industry as a means of delineating exchange field
boundaries for MNEs in emerging markets. Industry-
based fields are a variation of exchange fields (Zietsma
et al., 2017). Several features of the industry as an
exchange field are relevant to neo-institutional research
on MNEs. Industry is characterized by a center-periphery
structure, governed by formal governance units such as
national regulators, particularly the state (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983). As well, apart from competing, industry
participants can collaborate—for instance, through
industrial associations, who act as field coordinators, to
lobby for their interests (Karabag & Berggren, 2014;
Zhang et al., 2016). For these reasons, we contend that
an industry-based exchange field analysis provides a
useful way of balancing broad field definitions based on
national boundaries (e.g., Kostova et al., 2008) and fields
based around MNE-specific interorganizational networks,
offering a useful starting point for theory-building.
Without a doubt, even seemingly stable industries are
likely to experience turbulence in developing economies
regularly. However, we are guided by recent theorizing
(Donnelly & Manolova, 2020) and previous work in
international business where the industry has been used
to examine key emerging markets phenomena over time,
such as FDI spillovers (e.g., Meyer & Sinani, 2009).
Within fields, subsidiaries will likely differ in terms of
their access to tangible and intangible resources, such as
financial, human, or social capital. Bartlett and
Ghoshal (1989) distinguish between subsidiary charters,
associated with differences in local resource commitment
and strategic behavior. These arguments contribute to
our debate to the extent to which some MNE subsidiary
is more dependent on local resources than other national
sub-units, as well as being indicative of the locus of sub-
sidiaries’ interests (i.e., intra-MNE or externally-focused).
As subsidiaries differ in their dependence on local or
global resources and the locus of their interests
(i.e., intra-MNE or externally-focused), they may follow
either subsidiary- (local) or corporate-focused (MNE)
logic, prioritizing local over corporate interests and vice
versa (see Luo et al., 2019). We argue that operating at
the field center, periphery, or in between the two is asso-
ciated with different benefits and costs to the MNE sub-
sidiary as it entails prioritizing local or MNE-specific
interests and resources, as well as different expectations
imposed upon MNE by the local actors through external
isomorphic pressures.
Institutional strategies in emerging markets
MNEs have a number of responses to institutions avail-
able to them (Luo et al., 2019), ranging from acquies-
cence to and avoidance of institutional pressures, and
active engagement (Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi,
2021). Recent studies have positioned EMs as generally
receptive to MNE-initiated institutional change, due in
part to institutional weaknesses and voids prevalent
in such markets (Doh et al., 2017). For example,
Regnér & Edman’s (2014) study shows that the lack of
institutions (regulations and/or technical standards)
served as a particularly enabling context for the
introduction of supportive institutional arrangements
by Ericsson in Southeast Asia or AGA in Eastern
Europe.
Based on their review of literature on the wide range
of ways in which MNE can engage with institutions in
EMs to pursue their strategic objectives, Marquis and
Raynard (2015) formulated the concept of institutional
strategies. By applying an institutional lens to non-
market strategy literature, they identify three categories
of strategies open to actors in EMs: relational, infrastruc-
ture-building and socio-cultural bridging strategies.
Although not specific to foreign companies alone, we
contend that these strategies may be particularly relevant
for MNEs, as they strive for both legitimacy and more
favorable FDI conditions in host markets (Luo
et al., 2019). It is important to note that institutional
strategies complement firms’ market activities
(Baron, 1995; Dorobantu et al., 2017). Therefore,
although our focus in this paper is on the relationship
between MNE field positions and institutional, rather
than market, strategies, we return to their relationship in
our discussion of boundary conditions.
Relational strategies allow firms to forge and manage
relationships with external stakeholders, including
national governments, that may control resources pivotal
to MNEs’ operations. The importance of relationships
with business and government actors EMs to corporate
success has been well established in the literature (Peng &
Zhou, 2005). Building relations through networking is
often cited as a substitute for imperfect or absent EM insti-
tutions (Boisot & Child, 1996). In such settings, where the
state is usually strongly involved in the economy, compa-
nies also need to be able to carefully balance their interests
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with crafting links to the local political stakeholder
through corporate political activity (Rajwani &
Liedong, 2015). Overall, through relational strategies,
MNEs cultivate and manage their ties with external stake-
holders to secure legitimacy and gain tangible and intangi-
ble resources from them (Marquis &Raynard, 2015).
Infrastructure-building strategies address missing or
inadequate regulatory, technological, and physical infra-
structures in host markets that are directly relevant for
MNEs. Although relationships can, to some extent, com-
pensate for imperfect institutions, underdeveloped local
norms and regulations often pose challenges to MNEs’
ability to transfer best practices and implement intended
market strategies, spurring them to construct and pro-
mote formal or informal institutional arrangements, such
as legislation, standards, and private regulation, along
with or alongside other stakeholders (Child & Tsai, 2005;
Girschik, 2020). Similarly, MNEs might be challenged by
the absence of technology and physical infrastructure in
challenging settings, which at times are symptomatic of
institutional imperfections, such as corruption
(Ramamurti & Doh, 2004). Investing in infrastructure
could offer a means for MNEs to not only fill such voids
but also to potentially gain legitimacy in the eyes of local
audiences (Carney et al., 2016).
Finally, socio-cultural bridging refers to corporate
influence upon demographic and cultural dimensions of
the host context, including those that affect MNEs’ abil-
ity to tap into local talent pools. This involves educating
not only corporate employees (Björkman et al., 2007) but
also stakeholders more generally (Girschik, 2020), as well
as appropriately adapting MNEs’ own practices to the
local environment in order to bridge the differences
across home and host countries (Newenham-Kahindi &
Stevens, 2018).
Marquis and Raynard (2015, p. 322) suggest that “the
target, prioritization, and timing of institutional strate-
gies are likely to vary between contexts.” Following on
from this, we argue that not all institutional strategies are
equally desirable or available to subsidiaries of multina-
tional firms in EMs. First, there is a pronounced need for
subsidiaries to align their strategies with corporate FDI
objectives and resource commitments (see,
e.g., Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Second, institutional
strategies may be less available—or indeed useful—to
companies facing particular EM conditions. In the sec-
tions that follow, we therefore first develop baseline,
static propositions relating field positions to institutional
strategies before integrating the nexus of corporate-
environmental dynamism into our framework.
MNE FIELD POSITIONS IN EMERGING
MARKETS
Based on the above discussion, we argue that operating
at the field center or periphery, or between the two, by
following intermediate repositioning trajectories, is
closely associated with different benefits and costs to the
EM-based subsidiary. As subsidiaries prioritize local or
MNE-specific interests and resources, local actors impose
different expectations upon MNEs, which has direct
implications for MNEs’ institutional strategies in the
context of EMs’ environmental turbulence. We theorize
these relationships below.
Central position
MNEs positioned close to the field center are likely to
be well-established, high-status companies in host
markets, with a significant degree of commitment to the
local economy, for instance, demonstrated through
localization of manufacturing (Dörrenbächer &
Gammelgaard, 2006). A central field position is likely to
be associated with MNEs expecting greater returns from
locally-specific resources and adopting a local logic.2 This
amplifies their visibility—hence greater scrutiny from
external actors (Chiu & Sharfman, 2011) and fuels the
need to sustain their conformity to prevalent institutions
via external isomorphism.
A long-standing suggestion for MNEs is to prioritize
the value of local legitimacy as a key intangible resource
in host markets. MNEs suffer from the liability of for-
eignness (LOF), which results in discriminatory treatment
by local actors (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). When
LOF is acute, MNEs may consciously prioritize local
expectations over corporate interests (Wu &
Salomon, 2016) to increase local embeddedness and to
maintain themselves at the center of their respective
fields. This may be primarily achieved through relational
strategies, particularly by fostering relationships with
highly legitimate local stakeholders, such as the state or
regulatory bodies, state-owned enterprises, NGOs, or pri-
vate domestic companies. Whilst examining MNE opera-
tions in China, Luo (2001, p. 406) highlighted the
importance of “cooperative relationships” with the gov-
ernment officials and other field members because “coop-
eration with host governments mitigates the liability of
foreignness as perceived by officials and amplifies the
firm’s credibility and legitimacy as perceived by the pub-
lic.” Unilever, for instance, has worked with local NGOs
in India to deploy their Shakti project, a rural network
that greatly leveraged the legitimacy of the NGOs to fos-
ter relationships with local stakeholders (Dahan
et al., 2010). To an extreme degree, to gain local legiti-
macy in institutionally distant countries, MNEs may
even engage in corrupt practices that are widely accepted
locally but clash with corporate norms, straining their
internal legitimacy within the corporate network
2Under certain circumstances, for instance, in strategic and/or highly regulated
industries in EMs MNEs might only be able to approach the central position. For
brevity, we use the term ‘centrally-positioned’ to describe MNEs in both central
and near-central positions.
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(Rodriguez et al., 2005). For instance, subsidiaries of
Italian manufacturing MNEs could compromise the
“local legitimacy resulting in discrimination and adverse
treatment from host country stakeholders” (Rabbiosi &
Santangelo, 2019: 113) if not engaging in corruption, а
practice that yielded “local legitimacy advantages”’ in
developing countries. Subsidiaries, therefore, followed
the “autonomy-based dissociation strategy [from the HQ]
to minimize potential reputation and legal costs, should
the foreign subsidiary be implicated in a corruption
scandal” (Rabbiosi & Santangelo, 2019, p. 120).
Field constituents in EMs are most likely to expect
centrally positioned companies to prioritize investment in
locally-specific, as opposed to MNE-specific, resources as
part of MNEs’ local license to operate (Henisz &
Zelner, 2005), which may constrain the realization of
strategic corporate interests. Therefore, although large
and visible MNEs may be motivated to engage in shap-
ing local regulatory and normative infrastructure
(Hillman & Wan, 2005), greater expectations from field
constituents can limit the extent to which they can emerge
as rule-makers as opposed to rule-takers in the host coun-
try system (Cantwell et al., 2010). By favoring and foster-
ing local relational linkages, MNEs may be compelled to
engage in joint initiatives to change extant institutional
arrangements championed and led by the local actors,
such as governments and NGOs (Boddewyn &
Doh, 2011). For instance, MasterCard partnered with the
local Dominican micro- and small-scale lender Banco
Popular Dominicano and Asociacion para el Desarrollo
de Microempresas (ADEMI) to increase the availability
of credit cards to micro-enterprises and small entrepre-
neurs, thus improving the local business community’s
financial processes (Dahan et al., 2010). Ciputra Group’s
operations in Vietnam emphasized the importance of the
infrastructure-building (e.g., city sewage upgrade and
urban planning) to appease the government as a vital ele-
ment of their construction projects in the country
because, as the Group’s executive reflected, “the govern-
ment has to have its say; we sometimes have to do things
they want that really don’t make much sense” (Carney
et al., 2016, p. 890). MNEs may also be expected to put
efforts into maintaining local legitimacy through regula-
tory and normative compliance or corporate social
responsibility (Campbell et al., 2012; Zhang &
Luo, 2013), or generate positive local spillovers by
leveraging company-specific know-how (Mudambi &
Mudambi, 2005).
Given the importance of perception and evaluation of
a centrally-positioned MNE by local stakeholders in the
host market, we theorize that such central MNEs would
favor external over internal isomorphism and
propose:
Proposition 1 To maintain external legiti-
macy, centrally positioned MNEs in EMs will
tend to prioritize relational strategies toward
central actors, and their infrastructure-
building and socio-cultural bridging strategies
will be guided to foster local relationships.
Peripheral position
Peripherally-positioned MNEs position vary in size,
resources, and mandates, ranging from large yet
niche-oriented (Edman, 2016), small and competence-
exploiting companies (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005), to
recent market entrants (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). They
are not embedded within social networks in host markets
and are likely to rely on intra-MNE support to develop
and exploit capabilities. New entrants may gradually
develop local knowledge and relationships (Zaheer &
Mosakowski, 1997) but are initially likely to draw on
intra-MNE networks. Such MNEs, in effect, are “driven
by a corporate-focused logic” and “committed to
protecting corporate interests and achieving corporate
goals” (Kostova et al., 2018, p. 2628), whether due to
integration pressures from HQ, or because they recognize
the superiority of MNE practices over local ones
(Spencer & Gomez, 2011). For example, operations of an
American consumer electronics manufacturer in Brazil
showed that “under the condition of having been recently
set up in Brazil the subsidiary sought (or perhaps needed)
to develop better relationships with its internal counter-
parts than with its external ones” (Figueiredo, 2011,
p. 430). In other scenarios, local actors may deliberately
exclude peripheral MNEs from their networks
(Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). In Mexico, local Grupo
Elektra fiercely contested the market against Walmart,
which had a limited local presence (Bhattacharya &
Michael, 2008; Reuters, 2019). Walmart experienced
similar exclusion efforts by the local rivals in the
Brazilian market, effectively locking Walmart to the
cash-and-carry and membership-only market segments.
With a greater emphasis on corporate interest, such
MNEs can expect higher returns from proprietary
resources, for example, technology or practices. They can
realize corporate interests by purposefully seeking a niche
peripheral position in host fields by choice (Edman,
2016), for instance, by actively avoiding participation in
local industrial networks (Regnér & Edman, 2014).
In Russia, Gideon Richter, a small Hungarian
pharmaceutical manufacturer, has been avoiding
membership in all professional associations, including
the Association of International Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers (AIPM), despite its long-standing
effectiveness in offering legal, informational, and
administrative support to protect the interests of its
members in this market (Jacob, 2017). MNEs may,
therefore, demonstrate symbolic baseline compliance
with local pressures without losing foreign distinctiveness
and disrupting its global corporate coherence, which in
EMs need not require considerable investment, given the
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high heterogeneity of their audiences’ expectations
(Yildiz & Fey, 2012).
Because of limited engagement and visibility, periph-
eral MNEs might “fly under the radar” of local audiences
(Puck et al., 2013) but still have to meet their baseline
expectations for conduct (Suchman, 1995). In the absence
of motivation and limited local resource commitment
(Rugman et al., 2011), however, peripheral MNEs have a
partial understanding of local stakeholders’ legitimacy
requirements (Luo et al., 2019), which in turn limits the
effectiveness of their institutional strategies. Тhey are
unlikely, for instance, to invest in substantial physical
infrastructure-building projects, which require extensive
local commitment and prioritization of local interests.
Instead, they could pursue socio-cultural bridging to span
institutional distance between home and host countries
(Fortwengel, 2017) and achieve and/or maintain internal
legitimacy without radically disrupting local institutions
by meeting demands for non-negotiable compliance with
local regulations or ethical corporate behavior espoused
by the regulators and the civil society (Delmas &
Toffel, 2004). For instance, a Norwegian MNE operating
in the Ugandan utilities industry distinguished itself
through outstanding compliance with sectoral bench-
marks whilst, despite the close contacts with Norway’s
diplomatic representation that played a prominent role in
designing Uganda’s Electricity Act, limiting its political
connections in the country. The company also promoted
gender equality in the country by hiring a female CEO,
“something that was still rare in Africa” (Mbalyohere &
Lawton, 2018), providing an example of socio-cultural
bridging through human capital development
underpinned by HQ-mandated human resource manage-
ment practices. Since peripheral MNEs are unwilling—
and at times unable—to access central actors directly,
they leverage co-optation of other non-central actors with
links to the central players to influence them if required
(Prithwiraj et al., 2012). In Brazil, an American consumer
electronics manufacturer was only able to foster “arm’s
length linkages with some [provincial] universities and
research institutes to begin to understand their potential
as knowledge suppliers”, having been rejected by the cen-
tral federal universities working on establishing standards
of knowledge partnerships between universities and
electronic companies (Figueiredo, 2011, p. 432). Given
the importance of MNEs to maintain a global coherence
of corporate competencies, hence for the local unit to
pursue or strengthen internal isomorphism and attain
only a baseline local external legitimacy and status in the
host market, we propose that:
Proposition 2 To sustain internal legitimacy,
peripherally positioned MNEs in EMs will
tend to prioritize socio-cultural bridging
strategies at the expense of physical
infrastructure-building, and their direct and
indirect relationship-building will be oriented
toward local peripheral actors alongside the
intra-MNE network.
Towards a dynamic view of MNE positions in
host markets: conceptualizing intermediate
repositioning trajectories
Litrico and David (2017, p. 1007) noted that organiza-
tional research often defines actor positions “in structural
terms” and “relatively static over long periods of time.”
Yet, although early institutional theorizing often under-
scored taken-for-grantedness and unconscious reactions
to institutional forces’ influence, scholars have increas-
ingly developed an appreciation of intentionality and
effort in organizations’ interactions with their institu-
tional context (Lawrence et al., 2009, 2011). As such,
institutional scholarship has recently sought to identify
how actors might pursue position change over time
through the purposive action of organizational actors
themselves and/or shifts in the external environment,
which generate new opportunities and institutional
hazards (Lepoutre & Valente, 2012). Efforts directed at
field position change involve not only identifying
opportunities but also enacting them based on the
actors’ “perception, interpretation, and understanding of
environmental forces”, as well as their resources
(Wild et al., 2020, p. 353).
Indeed, arguments of managerial intentionality indi-
cate that MNEs may be able to change their positions
when they perceive the need or the opportunity to do so
through deliberate strategies towards institutions
(Santangelo & Meyer, 2011). From this perspective,
MNE managers are regarded as “having the power to
direct the organization” (Child, 1972, p. 2) and formulate
decisions to manage their environment. In their role,
MNE managers continuously conduct “evaluation of the
organization’s position – the expectations placed on it by
external resource providers, the trend of relevant external
events, the organization’s recent performance, how
comfortable the decision-makers are with its internal
configuration, and so on” and where “the choice of
objectives for the organization is assumed to follow on
from this evaluation, and to be reflected in the strategic
actions decided on” (Child, 1997, pp. 46, 48). For
instance, Santangelo and Meyer (2011) show how MNEs
might adjust their local commitments in response to
institutional uncertainty in host markets, whereas
Stevens and Newenham-Kahindi (2021) show that firms
operating in Africa use a variety of relational strategies
to avoid pressures to engage in corrupt practices
deliberately. Such managerial decisions, we argue, can
contribute to the ability of MNEs to undertake strategic
efforts in changing their field position in line with global
or subsidiary strategy.
In addition to these endogenous mechanisms, MNE
field positions can change through exogenous shocks.
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Although organizational fields also change through evo-
lutionary processes, more radical shifts occur and can
result from political turbulence (Carroll et al., 1988), but
also as normative and cultural demands emerge and gain
traction (Casile & Davis-Blake, 2002), in the wake of
structural change induced by policymakers (Reay &
Hinings, 2005) and various institutional change strategies
of field participants other than the focal actor
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Such field-level institu-
tional change results in shifts in legitimacy demands and
access to institutional and material resources for field
participants (Aldrich, 1999; Galvin, 2002), which in turn
privileges some actors and undermines the position of
others (Hardy & Maguire, 2010).
Shifts in local rules and norms that amend legitimacy
criteria, spurred by the actions of the government
(Murtha & Lenway, 1994; Child & Tsai, 2005) and other
local actors, including local competitors (Mutlu
et al., 2015) and stakeholders (Zhang & Luo, 2013), as
well as the effects of transition and regime change
(Schnyder & Sallai, 2020) can cause MNEs’ field
positions to change through, for instance, severed ties to
the state and other powerful political and economic
actors, legitimacy loss as a result of changing demands or
strengthening local firms. For instance, with the rise of
economic nationalism in decolonizing India, the
legitimacy of foreign multinationals was challenged by
protests against British companies, eventually spilling
over into negative perceptions for other MNEs
(Lubinski & Wadhwani, 2020).
In the view of the above arguments, a static view of
MNE field positions is insufficient to fully capture
MNEs’ post-entry experience and their leverage of insti-
tutional strategies in EMs. We propose that rather than a
static attribute, there is a need to capture MNE transition
between field center and periphery to theorize an interac-
tive perspective on the field positions and MNE institu-
tional strategies in EMs. Following this rationale, we
consider the potential drivers behind intermediate trajec-
tories followed by MNEs. First, instigated by organiza-
tional strategy and managerial intent, it denotes the
trajectory of an MNE deliberately repositioning between
the original and the intended field positions. Alterna-
tively, given EM turbulence, this position can result from
exogenously-driven changes, capturing organizational
repositioning between the original and the induced field
positions. We further argue that endogenously- or
exogenously-driven intermediate repositioning trajecto-
ries will affect the scope and configuration of subsidiary
institutional strategies in EMs differently.
Exogenously-driven intermediate repositioning
trajectories
We consider two trajectories of MNEs’ externally-driven
transition, both of which can be a result of actions by
other actors or the structural change: from central to
peripheral and from peripheral to central field positions.
From center to periphery
The central position for MNEs in EMs comes with a
number of risks. Maintaining centrality can become
costly as government and other stakeholder demands
become more stringent and sophisticated (Marquis
et al., 2011), making institutional maneuvering difficult
for MNEs embedded in established structures. For exam-
ple, after China’s WTO accession in 2001 and opening of
the mobile telecom market to foreign competition, the
government introduced policies favoring the CDMA
technology over GSM, which undermined the competi-
tive position of large multinational mobile phone compa-
nies in this lucrative market (Luo, 2007). As a further
example, in the wind turbine industry, the Chinese gov-
ernment gradually increased preferential treatment for
local companies. As they assumed greater dominance,
Vestas, the global industry leader, fell from second to
11th place in the local market ranking between 2006 and
2013 (Mathews & Tan, 2015). While Samsung was no
match to the market leaders Motorola and Toshiba in
the Korean semi-conductor market in 1960s, government
support as part of its heavy and chemical industries
(HCI) program as well as the firm’s internal capabilities
development, helped to establish the company as a lead-
ing memory chip producer in Korea at the expense of
both Motorola and Toshiba (Kim, 1997). The combined
effects of economic nationalism and protectionist policies
and the strengthened local competition effectively shifted
the power balance across a number of industries in EMs.
Several other drivers can push MNEs from the field
center to the periphery. Institutional theorists have
argued that central actors may be subjected to greater
scrutiny and accountability than their low-status peers
who engage in similar transgressions—due to a so-called
“liability of status” effect (King & Carberry, 2018). Thus,
we argue that firms who benefit from the visibility and
status associated with the central field position are likely
to experience more severe punishment for their transgres-
sions than peripheral peers. In a case of imposition of
stakeholder demands in China, local authorities
attempted to “catalyze change in the pharmaceuticals
market” where bribery was “widespread,” and which
involved a crackdown on GlaxoSmithKline’s (GSK) sub-
sidiary. In response, GSK introduced the toughest inter-
nal regulations on the market, hoping that the industry
would follow. The change did not spread to the rest of
the field (Financial Times, 2015). GSK was not the only
corrupt company in China, but its visibility and size
made it a target for state intervention. Similarly, compa-
nies like Coca Cola were the target of the Indian govern-
ment’s changing policies regarding equity structure by
foreign MNEs, as well as their visibility in the domestic
market made them more liable to experience detrimental
effects of the policy changes. In this particular case,
8 JACOB ET AL.
though Coca Cola decided to exit the market, other for-
eign firms decided to stay in the Indian market and chose
to either dilute their ownership or reduce presence in this
market (Gopinath & Prasad, 2013).
The central position, over time, may also come with
the risk of obsolescing legitimacy, whereby MNEs
experience a “gradual loss of legitimacy before the local
society resulting from the identification of this firm with
a previous social and/or political regime … perceived as
illegitimate or archaic” (Bucheli & Kim, 2012, p. 849).
Politically-connected Turkish MNEs in Libya experi-
enced a legitimacy loss when the Qadhafi regime, which
controlled “nearly every contract” in the industry, was
overthrown in the 2011 Arab Spring (Darendeli &
Hill, 2016). Similarly, Bucheli and Kim (2012) discuss the
case of United Fruit Company’s obsolescing legitimacy
across multiple Central American countries as a result of
its tight political connections becoming a liability in the
aftermath of coups or unfavorable election outcomes.
Likewise, British firms faced protests in newly
decolonized India (Lubinski & Wahdhwani, 2020).
Meanwhile, trade spats between Japan and South Korea
rooted in issues of World War II reparations bear risks
for Japanese MNEs in South Korea. The South Korean
government promotes decreased reliance on Japanese
producers by advocating—and supporting—local
companies to wrestle a greater market share away
specifically from Japanese manufacturers in supplying
domestic chip-making giants such as Samsung (Financial
Times, 2019b).
In sum, externally-induced changes reduce previously
central actors’ scope for institutional strategies in EMs by
diminishing their symbolic resources (legitimacy and
status) and ultimately reducing the value of their other
resources (e.g., tangible, technology, etc.) to field
constituents. As a result, in the face of legitimacy loss,
central firms might, at least temporarily, face challenges
in leveraging or building their relationships with
stakeholders. The case of Finland’s Botnia’s pulp mill in
Latin America (Joutsenvirta & Vaara, 2009) shows that
the loss of legitimacy driven by external stakeholders
(Argentinian NGOs, the State, politicians, activists, and
the media) was not reversible. As a result of ongoing legal
and political battles, the company had to reduce its
investment and sell the plant to another forest industry
group whilst attempting to build a dialogue with residents
and NGOs (Skippari & Pajunen, 2010). Elsewhere,
pressures from global NGOs forced Samsung to cancel
its involvement in the already approved global projects,
such as the Vung Ang 2 coal plant in Vietnam, and to
focus on completing only the existing projects. The
consolidated position of the interest groups held that
“coal undermines Samsung’s reputation as an innovative
leader in sustainability at a time of global transition and
decarbonization” (Chen, 2020).
With diminishing legitimacy, MNEs on this trajectory
to the periphery of the field will likely invest in enhancing
their social fitness through socio-cultural projects at the
expense of building institutional or physical infrastruc-
ture that would otherwise benefit them. This follows
organization theory, where focusing on survival under
legitimacy threat causes actors to follow safe,
conformity-driven strategies to maintain field member-
ship (Moliterno et al., 2014). In an earlier illustration,
GSK enhanced self-regulation, although its attempts at
normative infrastructure-building in China failed. United
Fruits announced extensive social programs in Latin
America to position itself as “the most socially conscious”
American company in the region (Bucheli, 2008, p. 448).
In Vietnam, Samsung saw benefits of engaging in public
education projects in the local Nga My community, even
as the decision not to continue mining coal at the Vung
Ang 2 plant was reached, centered on employability
under the changing economic environment (Samsung
C&T, 2020). Decreasing local legitimacy will likely limit
MNEs’ local relational strategies. Instead, they may fall
back on fostering internal legitimacy and relationships
with other intra-MNE actors who may provide strategic
advice or knowledge based on prior experience.
For the conditions of obsolescing MNEs’ legitimacy
in the host organizational field and increased local scru-
tiny, we propose that such MNEs would favor internal
isomorphism:
Proposition 3a On a trajectory from the cen-
ter to the field periphery in EMs due to effects
of external changes and prizing internal legiti-
macy, MNEs will tend to prioritize socio-
cultural bridging at the expense of
infrastructure-building, and their local rela-
tional strategies will be limited in scope,
instead re-focusing on the intra-MNE
network.
From periphery to center
In an alternative scenario, MNEs can benefit from an
institutional change in the host country despite not being
directly involved in orchestrating it. First, organization
theory scholars observed the phenomenon of “unearned
status gain” resulting from external change or action,
which refers to actors’ “unexpected and unsolicited
increase in relative standing, prestige, or worth attained
not through individual effort or achievement but from a
shift” in characteristics valued from status-conferring
audiences (Neeley & Dumas, 2016, p. 14). As a result,
companies can “work with the fluidity in a field to bring
about the change they desire,” using changes in the insti-
tutional context “to create new opportunities for them-
selves” (Wild et al., 2020, p. 369).
We have argued that institutional change in EMs
often comes with a changing balance of power and loss
of status among central actors, but it can also benefit
peripheral firms through a post-transition status gain,
enabling their advancement towards the center. In China,
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in the aftermath of the so-called “melamine scanda,” for-
eign baby milk formula producers suddenly found them-
selves perceived as more trustworthy than the
traditionally strong performing, government-backed
domestic companies (Moon, 2020). Here, social desirabil-
ity criteria changed so that foreignness unexpectedly
became a desirable organizational—and product—
feature associated with trustworthiness. Coca Cola
underwent a rapid revival in the Indian market in the
1990s with domestic liberalization as well as the affable
response from the domestic consumers and policymakers.
As a result of gaining an increasingly central field posi-
tion, the company was able to rapidly build a domestic
presence as well as compete with other domestic and for-
eign brands (Dana, 2000).
Second, the transition from the field periphery to the
center can be driven by the changing conditions that priv-
ilege MNEs due to their (superior) capabilities and thus
heighten the legitimacy of their practices. For instance,
Child nda Tsai (2005) describe the formation of the envi-
ronmental protection system field in China. The
government-initiated process involved multiple actors,
including NGOs, the media, and MNEs, brought on
board “by virtue of the technical expertise offered to gov-
ernmental agencies and the standards transferred from
MNEs in developed economies” (Child & Tsai, 2005,
p. 1023). Here, some MNEs benefitted from the state’s
role as an institutional entrepreneur and were able to
become “involved in the ‘relational framework’ … of
institutional development through joining advisory bod-
ies or working parties and assisting regulatory agencies
with relevant research” (Child & Tsai, 2005, p. 1024).
Notably, it was not the effort of MNEs themselves that
changed their position—they indeed became “field
makers” in the area of environmental protection on the
state’s terms. Tesla benefited from a change in legislation
that no longer requires MNEs to create a joint venture
with a local partner, a US$1.6 bn funding from Chinese
banks, as well as the “record-fast approvals by the gov-
ernment” to ensure the location of the company’s facility
in China. Based on these factors, Tesla was propelled to
the center of the field with its market share growth from
a mere 6% to 21% of the entire electric vehicle
(EV) market in less than 12 months (Nikkei Asian
Review, 2020a).
Under these scenarios, MNEs’ market commitment
(i.e., physical or technological infrastructure investment)
will be perceived as a necessity to expand local corporate
interests. MNEs will prioritize infrastructure-building
strategies, particularly in the area of norms and regula-
tions, but may also implement physical infrastructural
projects, specific to their capabilities and local demands,
more so than socio-cultural bridging. In China, Tesla
invested into the physical infrastructure through the con-
struction of its giga-factory 3 in Shanghai in 2018,
already localized 30% of its supply chain locally to sup-
port Chinese suppliers, and is actively benefiting Chinese
domestic EV manufacturers by way of spill-over effects
(Gessner, 2020). In these scenarios, MNEs direct
relationship-building toward local and corporate
(i.e., intra-MNE) actors, leveraging company-specific
resources, such as technology and experience, to pursue
MNE interests on local terms (Narayan & Fahey 2005).
Gradually, intra-MNE relationships and therefore, inter-
nal isomorphism may become deprioritized as a strategy
as global resources and knowledge undergo local adapta-
tion to enhance MNE legitimacy in the host country.
Uniquely to this market, Tesla has retrospectively fitted
all China-sold vehicle with the new charging technology
in order to comply with China’s State Grid’s GB stan-
dard and to enable the motorists to plug into existing
charging stations in the country run by other operators
(Nikkei Asian Review, 2020b).
Building upon the arguments regarding MNEs’
‘unearned’ status and legitimacy gains, which would
favor external isomorphism, we propose that:
Proposition 3b On a trajectory from the
periphery to the field center in EMs due to
effects of external changes and the need
to amplify external legitimacy, MNEs will
tend to prioritize infrastructure-building over
socio-cultural bridging strategies, and their
relationship-building strategies will be ori-
ented toward central local actors and gradu-
ally less towards global (intra-MNE) actors.
Endogenously-driven intermediate
repositioning trajectories
MNE transition in fields driven by the pursuit of corpo-
rate strategies can similarly take two forms: from central
to peripheral and from peripheral to central field posi-
tions. Both trajectories constitute proactive strategic
responses to environmental changes, based on manage-
rial perceptions of the resulting opportunities or risks.
From center to periphery
We have argued that occupying a central position may be
associated with limited MNE influence over local institu-
tions. Li et al. (2008) show a curvilinear relationship
between local embeddedness and performance for MNEs
in China, emphasizing that strong isomorphic pressures
of local over-embeddedness may negatively affect subsid-
iary competitiveness vis-à-vis other (including domestic)
firms. To avoid such constraints, MNEs may choose to
reposition from field center to periphery to gain greater
“institutional freedom” (Kostova et al., 2008). This argu-
ment is consistent with Dunning and Lundan’s (2008)
classification of efficiency-seeking behavior by MNEs in
host markets.
Centrally-positioned MNEs may experience negative
effects of dominant local prescriptions, such as
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corruption or other poor governance practices still
prevalent in many EMs (Zhao et al., 2014) or increased
geo-political risks (Schnyder & Sallai, 2020). Institutional
scholars note that adopting the tactics of “shying away”
from unwanted attention allows organizations to avoid
the scrutiny of dominant actors (Sgourev, 2013). MNEs
can, for instance, limit their visibility by reducing
commitment and project profiles in host markets
(Meyer & Thein, 2014). MNEs may also engage in strate-
gic self-marginalization (Edman, 2016), for instance, by
strategically adopting locally deviant practices (Shi &
Hoskisson, 2012), to escape pressures to engage in
HQ-discouraged practices (Spencer & Gomez, 2011), or
as a sign of voluntarily embracing the corporate logic
(Christmann & Taylor, 2001). The example of BP in
Russia demonstrates the company’s greater global focus
on renewables and the move to reduce its market share in
Russia despite local pressures to maintain existing levels
of investment and technology transfer into this market:
“BP, which holds a 20 percent stake in Rosneft as a leg-
acy of its investments in Russia, has said it will produce
less oil and gas in the future and only invest in the highest
returning projects” (Financial Times, 2019a).
Alternatively, as local competitors strengthen
(Luo, 2007), MNEs may strategically choose to refocus
their operations in the country toward niche positions
where they can leverage global competencies.
Edman (2016, p. 82) discusses such withdrawals, which
“may take the form of a complete exit of the field, or it
may be limited to a repositioning, to focus on other sub-
segments of the field.” For example, in the Russian retail
banking industry, local state-owned and private banks
emerged as dominant players due to a roll-out of new
products, greater use of technology but also favorable
reforms in the sector. Foreign banks, such as HSBC or
Barclays, were forced to retreat into the investment bank-
ing sector where they could use their global experience
and brands to benefit from relationships with multina-
tional clients (Financial Times, 2011). Walmart, for
example, reduced its presence in the Brazilian part by
selling 80% of its stake in the local business
(Bhattacharya & Michael, 2008).
Repositioning from the center to the periphery may
also require MNEs to refocus their relational strategies.
Organization theory posits that companies dynamically
evaluate their stakeholders’ salience and legitimacy
(Mitchell et al., 1997) and severe ties with those actors
who suffer a legitimacy loss (Jonsson et al., 2009). MNEs
might, therefore, de-prioritize ties with actors deemed as
lacking legitimacy in the eyes of management and/or
advocating unwanted practices. Instead, they will direct
relationship-building towards other peripheral actors
to justify self-marginalization, increasing integrating
HQ-mandated practices, gradually reducing their reliance
on central field actors to avoid their retaliation. For
example, Meyer and Thein (2014) show that with their
home countries imposing sanctions on Myanmar, western
MNEs pursued a “low-profile” strategy in the country,
limiting project commitment and relationships to only
“critical” stakeholders.
While deliberately de-prioritizing local status, MNEs
will likely abstain from making significant infrastructural
investments, which would either be unappreciated by
field constituents or clash with corporate objectives.
Siegel et al. (2019, p. 24) find that although weakly
locally embedded MNEs saw value in hiring female tal-
ent in South Korea, with limited local traction and
“counter-reaction from many regulators, customers, busi-
ness partners, and/or male employees,” these practices
remained deviations from the norm. When France’s
Alcatel attempted to improve Myanmar’s telecom infra-
structure at the time when the country was under the
scrutiny of the company’s domestic stakeholders, this
effort undermined the MNE’s global legitimacy
(Meyer & Thein, 2014). In line with our arguments on
the peripheral position, we expect this endogenously-
driven transition to entail selectively attending to socio-
cultural bridging to maintain the license to operate and
addressing sociocultural issues directly related to MNEs’
local operations.
In view of deliberate self-marginalization and de-
prioritization of local status—hence, diminishing the
emphasis on external isomorphism—and a focus on
maintaining and enhancing internal legitimacy by MNEs,
we propose that
Proposition 3c On trajectory from the center
to the field periphery in EMs as part of an
intended organizational strategy that priori-
tizes internal legitimacy, MNEs will tend to
leverage local relationships with legitimate
peripheral or niche actors, will de-prioritize
local infrastructure-building, and will only
selectively attend to the socio-cultural
bridging.
From periphery to center
Organizations can also attempt to enhance their status
(Boyle & Shapira, 2012). According to Sgourev (2013,
p. 1612), the “advancement from the periphery to the
core is aided by the collective action of assembling
resources, building coalitions” and “developing institu-
tional infrastructures.” Accordingly, we propose that this
trajectory can be driven by MNEs’ increased motivation
to improve their local status, especially by seizing oppor-
tunities offered by changing institutional conditions—
liberalization, the introduction of pro-FDI reforms, and
favorable shifts in local practices (Rao-Nicholson &
Salaber, 2016) or even, conversely, increased nationalism
and political risks. MNEs will be more compelled to gain
local legitimacy through participation and compliance.
Such strategic isomorphism (Deephouse, 1996) has been
linked to “favorable perception” and “formal endorse-
ment by regulatory agencies” (Doh et al., 2010, p. 1464).
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As repositioning from the field periphery to the center
requires accumulating significant symbolic and physical
resources, MNEs will be motivated to invest heavily in
infrastructure and socio-cultural bridging to support their
intended strategy (Narayanan & Fahey, 2005). They
must create demand for such investments by building
local relationships. Yet, accessing central actors from a
position of limited visibility is challenging. Some of the
relational strategies for these MNEs may involve build-
ing local alliances (Boisot & Child, 1996), participating in
industrial associations to collectively promote subsidiary
interests (Zhang et al., 2016), choosing to locate in indus-
try clusters where MNEs can develop linkages with local
firms (Birkinshaw & Hood, 2000) or NGOs (Marano &
Tashman, 2012). These efforts could enable peripheral
MNEs to enhance their position and move closer to the
field center by accumulating symbolic resources such as
status and visibility. In return for improved social posi-
tion, they can provide local actors with valuable
resources, expertise, and know-how (Narayanan &
Fahey, 2005), which can lead to field-wide diffusion of
MNE practices. For instance, a small French pharmaceu-
tical manufacturer Servier became the 5th biggest market
player in Russia by setting up the International Centre
for Therapeutic Research in 1999 and opening a local
manufacturing facility in 2007. Technology transfer and
physical infrastructure-building (insulin producing plant)
reinforced Servier’s strategy through alignment with the
Russian government’s healthcare programs, for example,
Pharma 2020, aimed at encouraging foreign pharmaceu-
tical MNEs to become ‘domiciled’ in Russia and supply
modern, effective medicines for its lagging healthcare sys-
tem. In doing so, Servier fostered working relationships
with the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade,
which it now leverages to promote its interests among
other bureaucratic units within the Russian government
(Jacob, 2017). In China, Microsoft was able to advance
its position since the initial investment in 1992 by helping
to develop the country’s IT infrastructure, which in turn
enabled it to form closer links with the state actors
(Bass & Banjo, 2020). Microsoft’s experience in China
also suggests that firms can use local alliances and acqui-
sitions to boost institutional strategies. Its infrastructure-
building (and indirectly, relational) strategy efforts were
further enabled by a tripartite venture with Tata Consul-
tancy Services China and Chinese software parks, aimed
at developing and unfurling banking applications for
local governments (Khanna, 2007).
In another example from Russia, Remondis, a waste
management company, successfully developed alliances
with local actors, including German business associations
and sympathetic bureaucrats, as well as securing the
endorsement of Greenpeace Russia, to enable it to
overcome the initial skepticism faced by the company in
Mordovia, a Russian region where the company is
based. Remondis educated local residents, including
schoolchildren, to change environmental norms and
secure acceptance for its business model (Stolica, 2015).
In Pakistan, HSBC partnered with Islamic Relief to offer
Islamic microfinance in the country. This move helped to
make the bank more mainstream as it recognized local
needs and requirements (Dahan et al., 2010).
Institutional transitions create uncertainty but can
also reduce isomorphic pressures by creating multiple
norms in host country fields (Newman, 2000). This cre-
ates opportunities for peripheral actors to improve their
position by advancing the legitimacy of their practices.
For example, Oriflame of Sweden and British Avon
entered Russia in the early stages of market transition,
but gaining a foothold was not easy. The direct sales
mode was new to Russia, so Oriflame engaged in innova-
tive socio-cultural bridging strategies. It recruited men
and became the first direct sales company in the country
to use TV advertising, even sponsoring a popular soap
opera with a door-to-door cosmetics saleswoman as one
of the main characters. Avon was the first direct sales
MNE to build a local manufacturing plant in Russia.
Together they co-founded the Russian Direct Sales Asso-
ciation (RDSA), aimed at popularizing direct sales in
Russia (RDSA, 2018). That both companies succeeded
in becoming central actors is reflected in the wide accep-
tance of direct sales as a legitimate practice and successful
engagement of the media as a critical stakeholder. Direct
sales companies are now thriving in Russia (Jones, 2010;
Financial Times, 2012).
For MNEs seeking to acquire greater local legitimacy
and status in the host market, which favor local external
isomorphism, we propose:
Proposition 3d On trajectory from the periph-
ery to the field center in EMs as part of an
intended organizational strategy that prizes
external legitimacy, MNE subsidiaries will
tend to use symbolic and tangible resources to
indirectly foster stronger relationships with




We set out to establish the importance of organizational
field positions for developed-market MNEs’ ability to
manage their institutional contexts, specifically in turbu-
lent EMs. IB scholars have acknowledged that MNEs
have a variety of response strategies to institutional con-
ditions, ranging from more passive adaptation to proac-
tive shaping of the institutional environment to overcome
its constraints (Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Doh
et al., 2017). We propose that this strategic advantage of
multinationality (Regnér & Edman, 2014) can be tem-
pered by MNE field position, which dictates the choice
and scope of institutional strategies available to MNEs.
12 JACOB ET AL.
By integrating arguments from IB and organization the-
ory, we argue that these strategies are not equally avail-
able to all MNEs, nor do they uniformly lead to firms
achieving their desired outcomes in the host market. In
EMs, firms are faced with HQ performance expectations
and local stakeholder pressures to contribute to the local
institutional development (Ramamurti, 2001).
We propose that by deploying configurations of insti-
tutional strategies inappropriate for their field positions,
MNEs will not benefit from either over- or under-
commitment to the host market. When losing or willfully
sacrificing local legitimacy (e.g., Propositions 2, 3c),
MNEs are unlikely to benefit from investing in various
types of infrastructure in host markets, as these efforts
are likely to be challenged or underappreciated by the
local stakeholders. Such strategies place a greater focus
on intra-MNE and a limited local relationship-building.
Meanwhile, MNEs need to carefully manage local rela-
tionships to maintain their license to operate as well as
making substantial financial and resource commitment,
to improve local legitimacy and status in host markets
(e.g., Propositions 1, 3b, 3d). Table 1 summarizes our
theoretical arguments by explicating the relationship
between field positions and configurations of MNE insti-
tutional strategies in EMs.
Our conceptual model and propositions are summa-
rized in Figure 1. Propositions 1 and 2 are associated
with static positions of MNEs A and B at the center and
periphery of the organizational field. Exogenously-
induced trajectories are represented by dotted-line arrows
(Propositions 3a and 3b), whereas solid line
arrows between central and peripheral positions represent
MNEs’ transition to the center and periphery driven by
intended strategy (Propositions 3c and 3d).
Theoretical contributions
By advancing the concept of organizational field and
field positions for MNEs, we respond to the call by
Phillips and Tracey (2009, p. 170) for IB researchers to
“take the concept much more seriously” and to redefine
fields as spaces based around MNE activities. In doing
so, we make three theoretical contributions, two of which
extend the application of institutional theory in IB, and
the third advances the understanding of organizational
fields by leveraging the MNE context.
First, we extend the work on institutional strategies in
emerging markets (Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Phillips &
Tracey, 2009) by relating them to static and more
critically, dynamic MNE organizational field positions.
Our primary contribution lies in offering a dynamic
nuance to the previously largely static view of MNE
organizational field positions and the associated assump-
tion of field structural stability in IB (Edman, 2016;
Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2016). Through an organiza-
tional field lens, we argue that MNEs can find themselves
in particular field positions as a result of exogenous
forces, but also through purposeful work driven by strate-
gic managerial intent. Maintaining a specific position, or
repositioning in fields, therefore, involves strategizing,
struggle, negotiation, and dynamic trade-offs between
local and global interests. Our analysis suggests that posi-
tion maintenance is resource-intensive—and occasionally
not a viable option. Further, MNEs are embedded in net-
works of stakeholder relations, which they can strategi-
cally prioritize as they strive to change their positions.
Changing relationships with powerful local stakeholders
(e.g., Meschi, 2005) or engaging with peripheral actors
will likely have consequences for the firm itself and the
structure of the rest of the field (Phillips & Tracey, 2009).
Our dynamic perspective on MNE field positions also
cautions against the implicit assumption of otherwise
resource-rich MNEs’ ability to achieve long-term central-
ity in EMs (Lecraw, 1984; Frynas et al., 2006) by show-
ing how powerful stakeholders, such as governments and
state-owned enterprises, may enforce rules and regula-
tions curtailing any opportunities for MNEs to advance
toward a central field position. This can effectively curtail
the MNEs’ possibility to deploy their otherwise prefera-
ble institutional strategies. The centrality of MNEs in
EM is therefore fragile, whereby corporate wrongdoings
or other legitimacy-reducing events can initiate irrevers-
ible repositioning trajectory towards the periphery
(Gifford & Kestler, 2008; Liu et al., 2019). In sum, by
viewing MNEs’ field positions as dynamic, we can con-
ceive of fields as interactive and inhabited spaces
(Zietsma et al., 2017).
Second, our framework offers a way forward for
scholars to understand how MNEs can leverage their
institutionally-shaped resources and advantages
(Martin, 2014; Regnér & Edman, 2014) to gain or
strengthen their foothold in a particular market, or in order
to overcome legitimacy challenges. Previous work in IB has
acknowledged that ongoing institutional volatility in EMs
has varied implications for MNE strategy (Xu et al., 2018;
Luo et al., 2019; Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi, 2021).
Well established in the literature are such MNE risk mitiga-
tion strategies in response to EM turbulence as changes in
host country commitments and operational strategies,
including enhancement of structural integration
(Feinberg & Gupta, 2009). Yet, scholars have also begun
to acknowledge that MNEs capitalize on opportunities
offered by institutional shifts through responding to the
changing conditions proactively to enhance their reputa-
tion, build relations with powerful local stakeholders or
contributing to local institutional development strengthen
local operations (Bucheli et al., 2019; Lubinski &
Wadhwani, 2020). We extend these conversations by sys-
tematically linking institutional strategies to MNE
resources and external and internal isomorphic demands
associated with organizational field positions.
Lastly, by using MNEs as a research context
(Roth & Kostova, 2003; Pant & Ramachandran, 2017),
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we also contribute to the current debate on the field
positions in organization theory. With few exceptions,
scholarship on organizational field positions has not
systematically addressed their dynamic nature. Recent
scholarship has started to remedy this shortcoming,
focusing predominantly on deliberate advancement
from the periphery to the center of organizational fields
(Sgourev, 2013; Wild et al., 2020). These discussions
have also largely overlooked intermediately-positioned
organizations, often disregarded due to their tendency
to conform to the prevalent institutional conventions
(Durand & Kremp, 2016). Indeed, Wright and
Zammuto (2013) recently proposed that intermediate
actors face competition from both high-status and low-
status field participants and are often interested in chal-
lenging established institutional orders, suggesting the
need to challenge the static view of these actors.
Leveraging the context of MNEs in EMs, we extend
this debate and propose a dynamic view of the interme-
diate position—the intermediate repositioning
trajectories—as resulting from external forces or pur-
poseful strategizing toward institutions, yet not neces-
sarily openly challenging the established institutional
order. The context of MNEs is particularly relevant
here because they are embedded in multiple institutional
environments in their home and host countries
(Tashman et al., 2019). As such, despite facing the chal-
lenges of institutional duality and, indeed, complexity
(Marano & Kostova, 2016), MNEs can also leverage
internal resources and intra-MNE legitimacy for their
long-term survival in turbulent settings. Although the
geographical dispersion may be unique to the MNE set-
ting, we argue that our analysis can offer insights for
theorizing on the dynamic positioning of organizations
straddling multiple organizational fields, as opposed to
those facing field-level pluralism (Greenwood
et al., 2011). Scholars have relatively recently began
examining the opportunities and challenges faced by
such organizations in responding to multiple legitimat-
ing audiences (Raynard, 2016). Our analysis suggests
that such actors may be able to navigate field-level
change by dynamically balancing their prioritization of
institutional pressures as they move between field
positions.
Boundary conditions and future research agenda
Our theorizing comes with a number of boundary condi-
tions. First, our aim in this paper was to provide an
institutionally-informed perspective on MNE strategies
in emerging economies, drawing on the concept of insti-
tutional strategies. Specifically, our goal was to relate
such strategies to changes in MNE field positions. Some
of the other strategies available to MNEs to address risks
in EM settings are therefore outside of the scope of our
paper. This includes, for instance, corporate mergers and
acquisitions, which IB scholars have considered as one
means for MNEs to gain legitimacy in host countries
(Lebedev et al., 2015). At the same time, post-entry
acquisitions that expand MNEs’ existing footprint are
not without challenges (Shi et al., 2012; Li et al., 2017).
They are still likely to be subjected to regulatory
approvals and ownership restrictions, especially in strate-
gically important industries (Erramilli, 1996; Makino &
Beamish, 1998). MNEs who find their legitimacy under-
mined by external events or their own actions are also
likely to suffer scrutiny from potential local partners (Liu
F I GURE 1 Conceptual model
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et al., 2019). We therefore treat institutional and market
strategies as complementary rather than as alternatives to
each other. However, future work could more scrupu-
lously examine how ownership and institutional strategies
interact, particularly in settings where MNEs face signifi-
cant ownership restrictions, or when such regulations
change.
Second, for clarity and parsimony in this paper, we
focus on industry-based exchange fields. Future
research could nuance our arguments by extending and
applying them in the context of other field types, not
least issue fields. This is particularly important as
MNEs might be members of multiple fields in the same
host country (Phillips & Tracey, 2009), which could
provide additional opportunities and challenges for pur-
suing the types of institutional strategies we discuss in
this article. This would validate the relational nature of
field positioning, whereby movement in one field affects
positioning in another one. It would be useful, for
instance, to examine how MNCs simultaneously navi-
gate repositioning within exchange and issue fields. The
experience of fossil fuel companies like BP, already
involved in multiple processes of debate and contesta-
tion in global issue fields of sustainability and climate
change, could be particularly instructive. It would be
useful how these companies might leverage issue field
building by activists in emerging economies to pivot
back to field center as issue field developments poten-
tially unsettle industry norms that prioritize fossil fuel
companies (e.g., Rosneft).
Third, industry and individual firm characteristics,
including ownership or nationality, can add further
nuance to our arguments. Foreign firms operating in
EMs through joint ventures are likely to be subjected to
additional legitimacy demands (Lu & Xu, 2006), but
might also leverage partner resources in pursuit of insti-
tutional strategies. The industry in which a particular
firm operates has a number of implications for institu-
tional strategies, not least because it defines the nature
of local competition and regulatory and normative
demands that the focal MNE would face in the local
market. Firms operating within the professional
and financial services industries, for instance, tend to be
more strongly constrained by industry norms and codes
of conduct that are highly specific to the local environ-
ment (Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2016), in contrast to
novel industries, such as software development. They
might also have limited access to infrastructure-building
strategies compared to firms operating in heavy indus-
try, manufacturing and other industries of strategic
priority to EM governments who possess the relevant
resources to tackle relevant challenges in these settings.
Sometimes, aligned political ideologies and economic
policies between home and host countries can propel
certain MNEs into a central position in EMs, such as
Soviet firms in Cuba, while displacing other MNEs
from the central position (Fagen, 1978). To that effect,
the formalization of diplomatic relations between
the Soviet Union and Cuba and the signing of the
Soviet-Cuba trade agreement, led to a requirement that
US-owned oil refineries in Cuba process the Soviet oil.
On failing to comply with this requirement, these
US-owned refineries were seized by the Cuban
government. Exit from the country may therefore signal
a failure of MNEs to deploy the institutional strategies
to secure both legitimacy and the favorable FDI
conditions in host markets.
Finally, our discussion in this paper has focused on
MNEs from developed markets operating in emerging
economies. In future research, our arguments may need
to be adopted to the circumstances EMNEs operating
in developed markets, as demonstrated by the legiti-
macy struggles by China’s Huawei and TikTok in the
UK and the US (Williams, 2020), or the success of
India’s Infosys in securing UK government contracts
(The Economic Times, 2011). This could, in turn,
extend the debates on liabilities of origin faced by
EMNEs as they expand into developed economies
(Ramachandran & Pant, 2010).
Pursuing the agenda outlined in our paper requires
methodological approaches that could capture the
dynamic nature of MNEs’ institutional strategies in
EMs. We believe that longitudinal qualitative studies
could offer the richness of data required for this analy-
sis. We particularly advocate the use of comparative
case study design (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009) to capture
differences in strategies between differently positioned
MNCs proposed in this paper. In doing so, scholars
could leverage historical data (Lubinski & Wadhwani,
2020), which offers the possibility of tracing the
outcomes of institutional strategies and their long-
term consequences for the studied companies’
operations. Longitudinal work is particularly necessary
for developing an understanding of how local
stakeholders respond to MNEs’ institutional strategies.
Although our dynamic framework provides some initial
insights into the ongoing nature of MNE-stakeholder
interactions, many questions remain open to further
study, such as responses by de-prioritized stakeholders,
corporate HQ, and local competitors (see e.g., Mutlu
et al., 2015). Lastly, qualitative comparative analysis
(QCA) could tease out the role of individual organiza-
tional factors, such as ownership structure, in
successful or unsuccessful MNE field repositioning
(see Fortwengel, 2017).
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